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Abstract 
Purpose - While the world-wide adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) aims to eliminate differences in national accounting standards between countries, the 
socio-political institutions surrounding financial reporting practices remain localised. This 
paper aims to penetrate and reveal the manner in which local national context, stakeholder 
intentions and financial reporting practices can moderate the compliance with IFRS in a 
developing country.  
Design/methodology – An interview-based qualitative research framework was utilised to 
analyse the experience and attitudes of accountants, auditors and financial reporting 
regulators during a passage of accounting reform initiatives.   
Findings – This paper provides a critical analysis of the financial reporting practices of a 
developing country that has ostensibly implemented accounting reforms prescribed by the 
World Bank. It has revealed the key firm- and field-level logics that are experienced and 
managed by regulators and corporate managers in their approaches to financial reporting and 
accountability.  The World Bank-led accounting reform can be constrained by a complex mix 
of institutional logics originating from market and corporate structures, networks of 
institutionalised family and political relationships, professional and regulatory structure and 
resourcing limitations, and cultural business conventions. This paper provides evidence of 
firm- and field-level logics that contest and influence the emergence of a financial reporting 
oversight body and lead to highly variable compliance with international accounting 
standards.  
Originality/value – This paper aims to extend our knowledge beyond broad national-level 
elements of institutional orders. It presents a more penetrating examination of the existence 
and contestation of logics originating from various local and global actors and interests. It 
presents a theoretical mapping of institutional logics which operate in international and local 
settings and also encompass firm- and field-level imperatives.  Any effort to understand and 
improve accounting practices of a developing country need to consider the power, 
contestation and influence of multiple logics operating in its institutional environment. 
Keywords - Financial reporting, Developing countries, corporate governance, Regulation & 
IFRS. 
Paper type – Research paper 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many countries have now adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as their 
national accounting standards. The widespread adoption of IFRS provides an opportunity to 
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evaluate the impact of global accounting standards in local environment. This issue has 
become more prevalent as the development of IFRS is significantly influenced by Anglo Saxon 
developed countries1. Most research published in the accounting literature has investigated 
the implementation of IFRS in the economically developed western world (Street, 2012; 
Nurunnabi, 2014; Gray et al. 2009). The IFRS is now used as national accounting standards in 
116 countries of the world (International Accounting Standards Board [IASB], 2016). 
Developing countries represent the majority of these IFRS jurisdictions. Three quarters of the 
world’s population is located in the developing countries and given their economic and social 
significance, accounting and associated accountability practices of these countries are 
relatively opaque. 
 
The implementation and compliance with accounting standards in the context of a developing 
country is the domain area for this investigation. This paper aims to contribute to that domain 
by providing a deeper field-level account of regulations and accounting practices in 
Bangladesh. The development of IFRS is influenced by western developed countries and 
assumes a capital market-driven demand for accounting information. These institutional 
characteristics are not necessarily prevalent in developing countries who adopt IFRS as their 
national standards. Puxty et al. (1987) and Chua and Poullaos (1998) argued that Anglo-
American models of governance rely on a number of institutional forces such as well-
developed capital markets, established accounting bodies and democratic institutions. Uddin 
and Choudhury (2008) questioned the suitability of regulations developed in western society 
(such as the USA and UK) to a traditional society like Bangladesh. Drawing on Weber’s notions 
of traditionalism, they showed that the Bangladesh business environment characterises a 
number of features of a traditional society such as corporate ownership concentrated in few 
families, family-led politics, poverty, business linked to political powers and loyalty toward 
powerful people rather than formal authority. Uddin (2009) demonstrated that the managers 
of even large publicly-listed companies are inclined to serve the sponsoring directors (and 
their families), often at the expense of other stakeholders.  
 
Bangladesh, like many developing countries, is characterised by a small capital market, bank-
led external finance, and family ownership: similar features of many developing countries 
(Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008). While every individual country, including the developing ones, 
are distinct in some aspects, the field-level knowledge about what has and has not been 
effective and under what circumstances can provide valuable contextual knowledge about 
the workings of a global accounting framework such as IFRS within a traditional society like 
Bangladesh. The findings from this study generates useful insights into how accounting 
regulations such as IFRS are practised in developing countries. This research offers an 
analytical generalisation by relating financial reporting motivations, pressures and practices 
to social processes and relations (Parker and Northcott, 2016). The knowledge accumulated 
in the research represents a ‘process generalisation’ (Simons, 2009) which may be 
transferable between and among developing countries’ contexts. The knowledge about the 
local institutional framework can be useful for World Bank and other international 
development organisations who are increasingly playing an important role in shaping the 
accounting and accountability in developing countries (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). 
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The economic growth and increasing connectedness to global trade has made Bangladesh a 
relevant setting in which to evaluate its accounting practices. With a current population of 
about 160 million, Bangladesh aims to be a middle-income country by 2021 (Raihan, 2016).  
PricewaterhouseCoopers predicted that Bangladesh would be the 28th largest economy by 
2030, from 31st in 2016 (Daily Star, 2017). In the context of the Bangladesh Government’s 
aspiration for future economic development and foreign investment, corporate accounting 
practices are increasingly become relevant to local and international investors. This paper 
investigates how the World Bank’s effort to improve financial reporting practices interacts 
with local institutions and actors in Bangladesh. The paper focusses on how financial reporting 
standards (IFRS in the context of Bangladesh) are implemented and what institutions and 
forces shape financial reporting practices and their extent of compliance with IFRS. The study 
also aims to penetrate and explicate the multiple institutional logics that prevail at various 
institutional and organisational levels, thereby influencing the extent of compliance with IFRS 
in Bangladesh.  
 
This paper employs a processual view (Parker, 2007) of the reporting environment of 
Bangladesh to identify and analyse the complex interplay of actors and institutions in resisting 
and implementing financial reporting reforms. It argues that such a processual view enhances 
our understanding about ‘how’ things work in the local reporting environment and ‘what’ 
influences such practices. Interviewing important stakeholders within the financial reporting 
environment offers an explanation that goes beyond a statistical measure of compliance with 
IFRS. Existing research has provided evidence about broad determinants (such as ineffective 
enforcement, weak accounting profession and small capital market) affecting compliance 
with accounting standards in developing countries. These studies (as discussed in Section 2) 
have mostly utilised cross-sectional statistical analysis of disclosure adequacy in annual 
reports of listed companies. The disclosure adequacy has been measured by comparing the 
content of the financial statements against a check-list prepared by researchers.  While these 
past research papers reveal important generic and broad-level determinants of compliance 
with accounting standards, we argue that our understanding can be extended by knowing 
how the firm- and field-level logics and practices construct the higher-level institutional logics.  
 
Existing literature has identified the basic national level determinants of compliance with 
IFRS. Moving on from that foundation, the overall objective of this paper is to uncover field-
based logics that shape actual financial reporting incentives and practices. The objective will 
be addressed by investigating three research questions (RQ):   
 RQ 1: What and how do firm-level logics (familial corporate ownerships and corporate 
governance practices) influence corporate compliance with IFRS? 
 RQ 2: What and how do field-level logics (regulations, accounting profession and 
financial institutions) contribute to corporate compliance with IFRS? 
 RQ 3: What logics underlie any change in regulatory arrangements? 
 
Through investigating these research questions, the paper aims to address Lounsbury’s (2008) 
call for institutional researchers to go beyond broad structural elements of institutional 
orders. To understand how broad structural elements influence ground level practices, we 
investigated how familial control impacts corporate management and its financial reporting, 
the roles of external capital providers (banks) in institutionalising accounting practices in 
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businesses and the impact of regulations on reporting and auditing practices. Rather than 
relying on a set of broad-level structural elements (such as stock market size, foreign 
investments, common versus code law origins), we investigate how institutional pressures 
and incentives are experienced and managed at firm-level by preparers and users of financial 
reports. This paper provides direct evidence of how preparers, users and regulators of 
financial reports practice, enforce and negotiate international accounting standards in a 
developing country context. 
 
The paper is structured with following six sections. Section 2 provides a discussion about the 
literature on compliance with accounting standards in developing countries and how this 
paper positions itself relative to that literature. The next section will explain the theoretical 
framework, followed by an outline of the research methodology employed in this study. An 
analysis of interviews and documentary evidence will be then presented in section 5 and 
finally an overall discussion and conclusion will be provided. 
 
 
2. Literature and gap 
 
Samaha and Khlif (2016) have reviewed the literature on IFRS adoption and compliance in 
developing countries. They concluded that compared to developed countries, IFRS 
implementation issues remain under-researched in developing countries. The majority of the 
IFRS literature focusses on discussing the actors and interests who have been influential in 
the adoption of IFRS as national accounting standards. This literature provides some evidence 
of institutional logics underpinning IFRS-adoption. Thus Nobes (1998) argued that a country’s 
financial reporting system is influenced by the prevalent modes of external financing. His 
model predicted that a country’s financial system that is dominated by bank financing rather 
than capital market financing would diminish the importance of external reporting and 
associated financial reporting regulations. As a further example, Boolaky et al. (2018) 
attributed the existence and growth of a capital market as the motivation for adopting IFRS 
in four Middle Eastern and North African countries. Thus jurisdictions that are perceived to 
make their capital market accessible to foreign investors are more likely to adopt IFRS (Hope 
et al., 2006) as a strategic response to transnational pressures as well as local factors (Alon 
and Dwyer, 2014). Further drivers for IFRS adoption have been found to include a country’s 
foreign aid dependence, its reliance on international trade and the level of education with its 
national economy (Judge et al., 2010). 
 
While identifying drivers and logics for IFRS adoption, this literature does not provide a critical 
assessment of the outcome of IFRS adoption with respect to such issues as organisational 
transparency, market efficiency, financial market development and foreign investments. This 
is particularly important as many developing countries, despite their adoption of IFRS, have 
nonetheless encountered institutional weaknesses such as a weak capital market, and a lack 
of corporate transparency and accountability (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008; Claessens and 
Fan, 2002). There are few studies that have investigated the implementation experience of 
IFRS in developing countries. Three studies of China GAAP versus IFRS financial reporting have 
been published. Overall they found substantial differences between Chinese GAAP and IFRS 
financial statements (Lin and Wang, 2001) with the 1998 Chinese government’s reforms to 
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harmonise the Chinese GAAP and IFRS not reducing the gap between Chinese GAAP-based 
and IFRS-based earnings (Chen et al., 2002). This gap has been attributed to weak 
enforcement, lack of accounting infrastructure and low quality auditing in China. However, 
more recently, an observed decline in earnings difference between Chinese GAAP and IFRS 
has been attributed to the Chinese Government’s 2001 compliance policy implementation 
(Chen and Zhang, 2010). In other national jurisdictions, variable compliance with IFRS by listed 
companies has been reported. These include high compliance by companies listed on the 
Zimbabwe (Chamisa, 2000) and the Saudi (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003) Stock Exchanges and 
variable disclosure and compliance of accounting policies among Asia-Pacific countries (Taplin 
et al., 2002). Thus research on compliance with IFRS or indeed with national accounting 
standards has produced mixed results. 
 
Research suggests that compliance with accounting standards largely depends on country- 
and firm-specific characteristics. However most existing research has utilised statistical 
analysis of earnings quality to identify broad and high-level determinants of compliance with 
accounting standards. These studies have investigated IFRS adoption and implementation 
using aggregate and broad-level determinants such as the legal systems (code versus common 
laws), capital market size and compliance index (comparing annual report disclosures against 
self-constructed checklists). While this evidence has made a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of broad-level determinants of accounting regulations, this study offers a firm- 
and field-level investigation that reveals how the local professional, social and political actors 
and interests mediate the influence and efficacy of IFRS in a developing country. 
 
Decision usefulness and accountability are embedded in the formulations of IFRS. This 
assumes the existence of a large stock market accompanied by a demand for accounting 
information for aiding shareholders’ investment decisions. Many developing countries like 
Bangladesh do not have a large capital market. In the absence of stock market-led demand 
for accounting information, we need to investigate the incentives and pressures for financial 
reporting and associated accountability. For example, as the primary provider of external 
funding, the role of financial institutions in financial reporting governance requires careful 
investigation. Claessens and Fan (2002) called for future research on the role of financial 
institutions in corporate governance while Holland (1999) has explored how some UK 
financial institutions pursue a corporate governance agenda with their client companies. This 
paper investigates whether the financial institutions in Bangladesh exert influence and 
pressure on the borrowers to understand and improve their governance processes including 
financial reporting practice. 
 
Research has provided evidence that institutional characteristics such as corporate ownership 
are not necessarily dispersed as in the case of some industrial western economies such the 
United Kingdom and Unites States. Majority shares of a typical Asian corporation are held by 
one or several members of a family (Claessens and Fan, 2002). A family often realizes effective 
control of the companies in the group using stock pyramids and cross shareholding (Yeh et 
al., 2001). In such family-controlled environment, it is important to investigate how the 
managers provide accounting information to outside shareholders and other constituents 
such as banks. This paper investigates the influence of such familial corporate ownership over 
the financial reporting practices in a developing country. 
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By employing qualitative research methodology, this study aims to reveal firm- and field-level 
behaviours, constraints and pressures that shape accounting practices in a developing 
country. Accordingly, it enhances the existing literature in two ways. First, it does not limit 
itself to the broad-level forces (such as foreign investment dependence or World Bank’s 
pressures) that require a developing country to adopt IFRS as its national standard. It extends 
the literature by providing empirical evidence about the implementation experience of IFRS 
in a developing country context. Second, it employs an institutional logics framework that 
maps logics prevailing at firm- and field-levels. It addresses the role of financial institutions in 
financial reporting governance, the emergence of a new financial reporting regulator logic 
and characteristics of the local environment. This micro-processual view of financial reporting 
practices and their determinants will add value to our understanding of accounting practices 
in a developing country like Bangladesh.  
 
 
3. Theoretical approach 
 
Accounting practices in Bangladesh have been explored in this paper using the institutional 
logics perspective to inform the analysis and interpretation of interview data and supporting 
documentary evidence. In this way, we aim to illuminate how institutions in the global and 
local spaces contribute to shaping the implementation of IFRS. The basic New Institutional 
Theory (NIT) proposition argues that organisations follow institutional norms in order to 
achieve legitimacy. This legitimacy-seeking compliance with institutional arrangements may 
result in structural uniformity among organisations in a field (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Thus 
the adoption of IFRS by many developing countries may resemble a structural uniformity in 
relation to accounting standards. However, what influence this has on actual reporting 
practices at local levels remains unclear. 
 
NIT assists our interpretation of financial reporting practices in Bangladesh during a time 
when some significant accounting reforms have taken place. For example, DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) coercive, normative and mimetic reasons for assuming institutional norms 
have the potential to explain Bangladesh’s adoption of IFRS and financial reporting oversight 
structures. Organisations may respond to institutional pressures through ceremonial 
conformity where formal structures may decouple from actual practices (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Oliver (1991) discussed other organisational responses to institutional pressures such 
as compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. Rather than assuming an imposing 
constraint, Scott (2008) highlighted the importance of knowing how institutions are 
addressed in individual organisations and how such practices transform social expectations 
and legitimacy. Modell (2009) argued that conformity with institutional demands varies 
across organisations. These varied responses to institutional pressures highlight the power 
and role of actors in shaping the field-level practices. This means that actors’ power and 
opportunities not only shape the creation and maintenance of institutions, but also influence 
field-level compliance. 
 
This paper has utilised Lounsbury’s (2008) theorisation of institutional logics to explain the 
multiplicity of influences over the financial reporting practices in Bangladesh. An institutional 
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logics perspective locates institutions at individual, organisational, field and societal levels. 
Thornton et al. (2012) argued that organisational actors are situated in multiple social 
locations and that institutional orders may originate from family, religion, state, market, 
professions and organisations. This perspective provides a useful framework for 
understanding how individual agents and organisational actors’ choices and actions are 
conditioned by the constraints and opportunities provided by multiple institutions that 
constitute their environment (Friedland and Alford, 1991). These are present at both local 
and global levels in relation to financial reporting practices in Bangladesh. Narayan et al. 
(2017), for example, illustrated how two universities responded differently while addressing 
an institutional demand for research commercialisation in the tertiary education sector. The 
responses were shaped by the universities’ respective historical contexts, expertise and 
strategic positions.  
 
Lounsbury (2001) argues that organisational decision-making requires a more penetrating 
examination of actors and practices. Friedland and Alford (1991), for example, conceptualised 
organisational fields as collections of multiple, competing logics that confront managers. The 
institutional environment could enable managers to choose from a set of logics that 
correspond to their particular contexts and positions. This notion of multiple logics and a 
contestation between actor micro-processes and institutions could uncover the determinants 
of organisation-level practices. This can potentially open up a ‘multi-level, meso range of 
research’ and expand the scope of institutional analysis (Lounsbury 2008, p. 351).  
 
The concept of institutional logics has revealed a range of explanations of institutional 
imperatives including institutional rationality (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), practice variation 
(Lounsbury, 2007) and institutional ambiguity (Meyer and Scott, 1983; D’Aunno et al., 1991). 
Research has provided evidence that institutional logics can shift over time (Lounsbury, 2002; 
Thornton and Occasion, 1999). This transforming nature of institutional logics conceptualises 
institutional environment as fragmented and contested (Schneiberg, 2007; Washington, 
2004). For example, Fiss and Zajac (2004) showed that German corporations varied in their 
adoption of western style corporate governance structures. The dynamics of variations in 
reporting practice can be driven by multiple logics.  
 
Lounsbury (2008) argued that multiple logics enable ‘variety in cognition orientation and 
contestation over which practices are appropriate’. Enforcement effectiveness, capital 
market size, concentrated family ownerships in businesses and political corruption are 
regarded as broad-level determinants of compliance with accounting standards (such as IFRS) 
in a developing country. Our study, using an interview-based qualitative research method, 
aims to find evidence of the pressures on managers and their motivations with respect to 
financial reporting practices. The interview sample represents managers in a range of 
organisations and regulators to shed light on how multiple logics influence firm-level financial 
reporting practices.  
 
Lounsbury (2008) also argued that the challenge for any institutional analysis is to understand 
how variation in field-level practices results in the creation of socially acceptable new 
practices. This paper investigates how actual financial practices deviate from expected 
practices anticipated by IFRS adoption and how such deviations lead to structural changes in 
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the reporting environment. This paper goes on to find some evidence of the emergence of a 
new logic (formation of a new financial reporting oversight body) in the financial reporting 
environment. Similarly, the paper evaluates how financial institutions, as the major source of 
external finance, position themselves in relation to the financial reporting practices of 
business organisations.    
 
 
4. Research method 
 
Bangladesh’s financial reporting environment was investigated as a case study of a developing 
economy that has adopted World Bank’s prescribed accounting reforms such as IFRS and an 
oversight body. The utilisation of field-based case study method enables this research project 
to conduct a holistic investigation and analysis of financial reporting incentives by considering 
the broader and complex social and environmental context in which accounting operates in 
Bangladesh (Stake, 2010). Through offering thick description, this study aims to unpack the 
processes and rationales behind the IFRS implementation process within the context of this 
case study country (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008; Woodside, 2010). 
 
This study employs an embedded single-case study design where attention is paid to various 
sub-units under the broad area of interest (Yin, 2014). The primary unit of analysis is 
implementation of accounting reform in Bangladesh. The sub-units include the regulators, 
report preparers, report users and auditors of financial reporting, regulatory processes, 
enforcement mechanisms and institutional frameworks. Therefore, the sub-units embrace 
both the structures and processes to reflect the actions of the relevant actors. 
  
Interviews of relevant stakeholders are the primary source of data for this research project. 
The initial interviews were conducted in 2009-2010. Subsequent interviews were conducted 
in 2016. The interviewees’ comments in 2016 were similar to the views expressed in earlier 
interviews. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) has adopted IFRS as 
the Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards (BFRS). Interviews allowed access to important 
processual and contextual information about the various aspects of the financial reporting 
environment. Thirty-five interviews with senior managers of various stakeholder 
organizations were undertaken. Interviewee identification and selection involved purposive 
sampling based on meeting one or more of the following criteria: preparers and users of 
financial reports, auditors, regulators, World Bank officials and senior researchers. Table 1 
provides a sectoral allocation of interviewees. 
 
Table 1 should be inserted here 
 
The selection of interview respondents paid attention to the need to obtain a variety of 
perspectives on financial reporting practice in Bangladesh (McKinnon, 1988). The researchers 
in this study therefore interviewed a range of stakeholders associated with financial reporting 
practice in Bangladesh. In this way, we sought to penetrate financial reporting stakeholders’ 
experiences and attitudes (King, 2004; Hennink et al., 2011). They constituted a set of 
identifiable experiential ‘experts’ in relation to financial reporting practices in Bangladesh, 
allowing us to address this process from the perspectives of those involved and eliciting what 
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they consider pertinent to accounting reform implementation, influences and outcomes 
(Meuser and Nagel, 2009). Snowball sampling technique was also utilised, as interviewees 
often referred to people who have important insights about the area of investigation. Every 
effort was made to interview such referrals to enrich the understanding of the various 
governance aspects of financial reporting practice. The overall approach allowed the 
researchers to obtain information from a wide range of stakeholders. Appendix A provides 
detail concerning the industry, designation and education of the interviewed participants. 
 
This research employed semi-structured interviews of individuals with different perspectives 
and interests, aiming to identify their perceptions, motivations, decisions and practices 
(Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Hennink et al., 2011). The guiding interview questions are 
included in the Appendix B. Even though a general set of open-ended interview questions was 
utilised as a guide, the interviewer retained a flexible approach which accommodated the 
interview taking new directions based on the issues which were discussed by the 
interviewees. Thus interviews often took the form of a guided conversation and flexible 
exchange between interviewer and interviewee (Fontana and Frey, 1994). The approach of 
the researcher was to allow and facilitate the interviewees to express their views, and with 
the use of probe questions to further penetrate and unpack those views and their 
explanations (Glesne, 2016). In some cases, the interview questions were based on the ‘leads’ 
which the interviewer followed up from interviewee to other questions responses (Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995).  
 
All interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed in word document format. Field and 
reflective notes were also utilised to record insights and reflections experienced during and 
after the interviews. The notes often recorded contradictions or new insights which prompted 
further investigation by posing new sets of questions. One of the authors possesses 
knowledge about the financial reporting environment by virtue of prior professional 
experience in Bangladesh. This provided a valuable contextual understanding about the 
financial reporting regulation and practices in Bangladesh. Uddin and Choudhury (2008) 
highlighted the use of researchers’ work experience for facilitating and enhancing insights 
into data interpretation and analysis. 
 
Initial memos were prepared from the transcribed interview data and field notes. These 
memos were based on preliminary concepts arising from the interviews and were labelled by 
assigning blocks of text (interviewee comments) to a particular theme. Following Gioia et al. 
(2012, p. 21) a data structure was developed with ‘first order concepts’, ‘second order 
themes’ and ‘overarching (aggregate) dimensions’. Reflecting Gioia et al.’s (2012) data 
analysis method, Appendix C provides a detailed account of how the interview data were 
structured and analysed in this study. A similar approach was introduced by Garrett-Jones et 
al. (2005) where themes were organised into a hierarchy of broad themes and their sub-
themes.  The texts of a number of interviews are provided to project the context in which the 
analysis was made. The texts also provide the opportunity to reflect the opinion of the 
interviewees (Islam and Deegan, 2008). 
 
One important determinant of the compliance with IFRS is the disclosure regulations and their 
enforcement. In order to understand and explain the interviewees’ positions in relation to the 
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enforcement of disclosure regulations, three legislative Acts (Companies Act 1994, Finance 
Act 2018 and Bank Company Act 19912) were consulted. This additional documentary 
evidence was utilised to reflect the institutional logics that underlie the enforcement 
pressures and practices in Bangladeshi reporting environment. 
 
5. Analysis of interview data and documentary evidence 
 
This section presents an analysis of interview data and some documentary evidence (various 
regulatory Acts regarding financial reporting) to explore the incentives, pressures and 
capacities within the financial reporting environment during some World Bank-led accounting 
reforms in Bangladesh. The reflections from the interview data are grouped into five 
overarching themes, each indicating a set of institutions impacting on financial reporting 
practices. These classifications reveal that actors and influences span both firm- and field-
levels. Overall the evidence suggests that that financial reporting practices within 
organisations are deeply rooted in the professional and regulatory practices prevailing in the 
country. While the technical requirements of the accounting standards are important, the 
actual accounting practices respond to a wide range of institutional forces.  
 
 
5.1 Familial control over reporting practices and accountability 
 
The interviewed managers identified familial corporate ownership as an influential 
institutional logic impacting financial reporting practice. The majority of large businesses 
(including the ones which are listed on the stock exchange) in Bangladesh are controlled by 
the promoters and their families. The promoters’ families retain enough share-holding rights 
to control the businesses. In order to reduce the concentration of ownership and control, the 
Bangladesh Bank (the central bank of Bangladesh) does not allow a person and his/her spouse 
to be the director for more than six consecutive years and they together cannot hold more 
than 5% of issued shares in any one bank. However, some entrepreneurs continue to hold 
majority shares in the names of their relatives and thereby keep the controlling voting rights 
within the family: 
 
Promoters now keep shares in different names and still control the banks. Still 
many financial institutions comply with the guidelines in paper, but have not 
changed their actual practices [Deputy General Manager, Bangladesh Bank].  
 
An NIT perspective pays particular attention to the roles of key actors in 
microinstitutionalising processes. This leads us to examine the role of key actor groups in 
Bangladesh corporate governance and financial reporting practice. One such group is families 
who effectively control many Bangladesh companies. A controlling family dominates the 
organisational decision making process by occupying key management positions (such as 
Chief Executive Officer and Head of Operations).  That controlling family often appoints a 
management team who is loyal to them. It is common to find employees who work in a 
company for their entire career. These employees often hold managerial positions and carry 
out the instructions of the controlling family. The controlling family exerts significant 
influence over the recruitment, compensation, and promotion of professional managers 
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including accountants. In a Bangladeshi environment, managers have the economic incentive 
to act in the best interests of the controlling family shareholders. So financial reporting and 
transparency are subject to the self-interests and power relations of local actors. 
 
Officially we work in a listed company, but in reality we actually work in a family 
business. We serve the family owners and they take all the decisions. The family 
(members) actually gets more benefits in addition to dividend. Even if the 
company makes a loss, the family owners can take Tk 100,000 monthly. We just 
show it as an expense. The family members do not need to wait for the company 
to officially declare dividend. We have to accommodate the various benefits which 
were taken by the promoters’ families. They receive more than their legitimate 
entitlements. This is a reflection of weak corporate governance and accounting 
integrity in Bangladesh corporate environment. [General Manager (Accounts), 
local large listed group of companies] 
 
The accountability imperative of financial reporting embedded in IFRS is moderated by the 
family-controlled corporate environment in Bangladesh. The question of consolidated 
financial statements provides a particular insight into how familial control over corporate 
groups of companies affect the compliance with IFRS. Concentrated family ownership is 
common in groups of companies in Bangladesh. Successful business entrepreneurs often 
diversify into various businesses that operate under the control of the promoters’ families. 
Interviewed auditors declared that most of the corporate groups do not comply with IFRS 10 
Consolidated Financial Statements. The absence of consolidated financial statements is 
illustrated by the practice of one of the largest group of companies in Bangladesh. The Chief 
Financial Officer (responsible for the preparation of financial statements) of the group was 
interviewed for this research.  This group (labelled as ‘A’ in this paper) operates several 
subsidiary companies operating in a number of industries. Most of the subsidiary companies 
are registered as private entities. A few subsidiaries are listed on the stock exchange with 
majority shareholding maintained by the promoter’s family. A holding company was formed 
that owns the shares of the large private companies. The promoter’s family members hold 
the shares of the holding company, which is registered as a private company. Thus a corporate 
structure was formed which is not subject to the financial reporting regulations of the stock 
exchange and Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC). Once more this 
reflects controlling families’ manipulation of reporting structures, decoupling actual practice 
from international standards. 
 
Such noncompliance with international standards, even by some of the largest corporate 
groups of the country, appears to be often accepted by auditors. For example a partner of 
one audit firm revealed the following conversation with the Chairperson of group ‘A’ in 
relation to the preparation of consolidated financial statements: 
 
Audit partner: All the companies within your group work under the control of the 
holding company. Your group should prepare consolidated financial statements. The 
member companies within the group are large and regularly involved transactions with 
banks and other parties. 
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Chairperson of group A: The Companies Act 1994 does not require the preparation 
of consolidated financial statements. It actually does not mandate the compliance 
with IFRS for the preparation of financial reports. Explain what would happen, if 
we do not do it [consolidated financial statements]. If you say that I will get a 
penalty for not doing it, then I will do it. Otherwise, I will not. 
 
This shows the lack of enforcement of accounting regulations even in the case of a large 
corporate group audited by a well-known audit firm. This evidence indicates the strength of 
familial ownership logic that opted for minimal corporate reporting knowing the absence of 
penalties for non-compliance with accounting standards. A further example relates to 
consolidated financial statements. An interviewed Chief Financial Officer revealed that all 
companies within the group ‘A’ work under the common control of the promoter’s families. 
There are also transactions (sale of goods and services, loans and guarantee) among the 
member companies of the group. If a bank provides a loan to one company of a group, it 
would be arguably beneficial for the bank to see the consolidated financial statements of the 
group. However such statements are not prepared. Furthermore, potential investors do not 
have the opportunity to examine the consolidated financial statements when one company 
of a group issues shares in the stock market. Thus as NIT argues, corporations can respond to 
consolidation standards and regulations in highly creative ways (in case of group A, it is the 
formation of a holding company which is not listed on a stock exchange) that avoid those 
requirements and manipulate or suppress disclosure. This leaves other actors such as auditors 
and investors in passive and powerless positions.  
 
 
5.2 Corporate governance practices limiting reporting accountability  
 
The BSEC introduced a ‘Corporate Governance Guidance’ for all listed companies in 2006. 
Companies need to disclose information about their governance processes according to the 
guideline on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. The guidance encourages companies to establish an 
audit committee, compliance officer and independent directors. These corporate governance 
mechanisms were aimed to improve the financial reporting practices and associated 
accountability in listed companies in Bangladesh. However interviewees also reported that 
controlling shareholders select their own associates as independent directors. Due to their 
close relationship with the controlling family owners, many companies’ independent 
directors do not effectively oversee the activities of the board and management. Many 
interviewees revealed that independent directors are mostly appointed to secure their 
specialised services, not to provide an independent review of the operation of the business. 
Interviewees asserted that reputed information technology specialists or retired bankers are 
appointed as independent directors to help the company to develop its information system 
or to obtain loans from the financial institutions. For obtaining loans, the banking regulations 
of Bangladesh, specify that commercial banks need to ensure that the requirements of a 
‘credit risk grading’ are fulfilled by client organisations. This requires the banks to assess 
governance structure and financial reporting practices of borrowers.  
 
Some of our borrowers do not maintain proper accounting records. They lack 
the knowledge about the importance of maintaining a proper accounting 
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system. We often estimate the revenue of client organisations based on bank 
statements and some sales vouchers. We often assume an estimated 
percentage of the revenue as profit. [Manager of a local bank]  
 
However financial statements of some borrowing organisations are prepared on the basis of 
the judgement of bank credit officers and are not based on a reliable accounting system. From 
the observations of interviewees across the study, the banks and their credit risk grading do 
not contribute to the development of financial reporting and other governance structures in 
client organisations. Rather the banks prepare simplified information on behalf of corporate 
clients in ceremonial compliance with their own lending policies. Alternative financial 
evaluation practices become legitimised as the norm and effectively institutionalised. This 
reinforces the entrenched decoupling of actual financial reporting and accountability 
practices from those mandated by corporate regulations and international standards.  
 
From within the banking community, interviewed bank managers argued that the Bangladesh 
Bank should exert more pressure on banks to play an effective role in improving corporate 
governance and reporting practices of borrowing companies. They also contended that if 
some banks are assessing the governance and reporting practices of borrowers whereas other 
banks are not doing the same, then the latter banks would attract more business as borrowers 
find it easier to obtain loans from them: 
 
It is not an even playing field. Sometimes when I start assessing the governance 
and reporting practice of borrowers, they often ask me why I am asking for so 
many things when other banks do not require anything. Therefore, I make a 
compromise to secure business. [Senior Manager (Credit) of a local bank] 
 
Weak corporate governance at the firm level has resulted in inadequate financial reporting 
practices. Though acknowledging the need for accurate and adequate accounting practices, 
the banks fail to exert any pressure for effective reporting and accountability due to 
competitive pressures. External financing pressures, either from the banking sector or the 
small capital market, largely fail to influence financial reporting governance of borrowing 
companies. The information needs of capital market participants underpinning a western 
financial reporting model do not resonate in the Bangladesh reporting environment. 
 
 
5.3 Fair value accounting in underdeveloped capital markets: a misfit 
 
A number of international accounting standards (such as IFRS 13 Fair value measurement; IAS 
32 Financial instruments: presentation; IAS 39: Financial instruments: recognition and 
measurement; and IAS 41: Agriculture) incorporate measurement of assets and liabilities at 
fair values. This fair value accounting raises some difficulties with respect to accounting 
practices in Bangladesh. In the absence of an active capital market, fair value accounting 
allows the utilisation of recent transaction history or valuation models. Interviewed auditors 
and bank officials were concerned that corporate managers can use this discretion to 
overstate profit and the asset base of the business in order to secure new loans, or to raise 
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new capital from the stock market. Interviewed managers also highlighted the shortage of 
technical resources and expertise in the implementation of IFRS: 
 
To my knowledge, there are only two actuaries who are available to assess 
retirement benefit obligation for businesses. No local companies hire actuary 
to value the post-employment benefits and liability. [Manager of a listed 
company] 
 
Interviewees contended that capital markets in Bangladesh are not developed and efficient. 
In particular, interviewed accountants explained that due to the small size of the stock market 
and ineffective law and enforcement, a small number of investors often influence the share 
prices by trading heavily or by spreading rumours in the market. Some interviewed 
investment bankers also revealed that application of IFRS 32 and 39 would make the 
accounting profit volatile because of the major fluctuations in the stock prices. Interviewed 
accountants declared that most of the companies record investment in financial instruments 
at initial cost. Changes in fair value of investment in financial instruments are not recorded in 
the income statement. Highlighting the irrational behaviour of the market, one interviewed 
investment banker said that the price-earnings ratio often reaches above 50 for many 
companies listed on the stock exchange. Most investors have very little knowledge about the 
fundamentals of stock valuation and trading strategies. 
 
Most of the shareholders and investors of the stock exchanges here have little 
knowledge about accounting information. They may see some accounting 
information, but mostly they transact on word-of-mouth or rumour. There 
were few occasions where few people manipulated the market prices. These 
people placed an upward price movement by buying shares in the market. By 
seeing these upward trends, the general investors become confused and start 
buying these shares. Once the general inventors start to buy the shares, the 
manipulators got out of the market by selling the shares. [Senior Manager 
(Accounts) of a multinational company] 
 
Thus given the Bangladesh market conditions and corporate governance structures, 
influential actors such as controlling families can creatively and strategically respond to any 
IFRS adoption pressures, entirely preserving their own interests. In the absence of pressure 
from the capital market and banks, it is important to see how regulations and their 
enforcement influence the financial reporting practices. 
 
 
5.4 Reporting pressures in a weak regulatory enforcement 
 
At the formal institutional level, national reporting regulations present an initial image of 
regulatory activity and intent. However such national level regulations are not necessarily 
promoting IFRS and can result in quite different reporting practices and compliance levels. 
Three regulatory Acts govern the financial reporting practices in Bangladesh. The Companies 
Act 1994 requires all registered companies to audit their financial reports. However, the Act 
does not prescribe or mandate any accounting standard (such as IFRS) or auditing standards. 
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In contrast, the Finance Act 2018 requires all private and public companies to prepare and 
audit financial reports in complying with the IFRS. According to this Act, companies are 
required to submit the financial reports with their annual income tax return. The third 
legislative Act, the Bank Company Act 1991, governs the financial reporting requirements in 
the banking sector. This Act only mandates the former IAS 30 (corresponding to current IFRS 
7 and 9, IAS 32 and 39) (Ahmed, 2015). The Act is silent on whether the rest of the IFRS is 
required to be applied.  
 
With respect to banking regulation, these three regulatory Acts are simultaneously applicable 
to banking companies. These Acts’ financial reporting regulations are often inconsistent. This 
resulted in ambiguous financial reporting regulations for banking companies. The Companies 
Act 1994, Finance Act 2018 and Bank Company Act 1991 should specify the required 
accounting and auditing standards. Interviewed managers suggested that these Acts need be 
coordinated to avoid any conflicting regulatory requirements. About one half of the banks 
and financial institutions are listed on the country’s two stock exchanges. In addition to the 
three Acts, these listed bank companies are subject to the financial reporting regulations of 
the BSEC. 
 
There are six agencies occupying the financial reporting regulatory space in Bangladesh. These 
agencies and associated Acts are often conflicting and result in ambiguity within the 
regulatory framework. Table 2 provides a list of financial reporting regulators and their 
regulatory framework. The banking sector is the main source of private sector finance in 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh Bank regulates 57 banks and 21 non-bank financial institutions. The 
Bank Company Act 1991 governs the financial reporting requirements in the banking sector. 
This Act only mandated select number of IFRS. Interviewed senior manager of the Bangladesh 
Bank highlighted large-scale variations of the financial reporting practices among the financial 
institutions in Bangladesh. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
With respect to reporting regulation and enforcement, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies 
and Firms (RJSC) requires all registered companies and firms to file audited financial 
statements. The World Bank (2015) found that only 10% of the companies comply with this 
requirement. Interviewed auditors informed that the RJSC suffers from serious lack of 
resources, technical expertise and work force to check the quality of financial reports of 
registered entities. Furthermore, the BSEC requires all listed companies to prepare and audit 
financial reports in compliance with IFRS and international standards on auditing (ISA). The 
BSEC’s Corporate Finance Department oversees the financial reporting of listed companies. 
The listed companies are required to submit their audited financial statements to the BSEC, 
which however does not have necessary expertise and resources to examine their financial 
reports. This lack of resources is reflected in the following comments made by one Director 
of the Corporate Finance Department of the BSEC: 
 
We have three employees who are overseeing the financial reporting of 271 listed 
companies. We do not have any professionally qualified chartered accountants. This 
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limited resource is a big problem for overseeing the financial reporting practices of 
the listed companies. 
 
Interviewed auditors and investors contended that inadequate penal actions of the BSEC 
create limited pressure on companies to comply with disclosure regulations. Interviewed 
BSEC officials mentioned that companies use their political connections to influence the 
BSEC’s enforcement actions. The BSEC also faces pressures from political parties to waive 
many imposed penalties on companies. In most cases, the BSEC enforcement activities are 
limited to issuing warnings and directives. 
 
The directors of many businesses maintain connections with the political leaders. Our 
organisation is not outside the socio-political realm of the country. Companies often 
use their political connection to avoid penalties for non-compliance with accounting 
standards or breach of disclosure regulations. Often we end up with issuing 
‘warnings’ which is a weak forms of enforcement action. [Director of the BSEC] 
 
Institutionalised local legal frameworks and customs present a further limitation to financial 
reporting compliance. The legal and judiciary system of Bangladesh is not conducive to 
protecting the rights of investors and creditors. The interviewed managers of the BSEC 
believed that the majority of general investors are not aware of their legal rights. Enforcement 
actions of regulators sometimes become ineffective because of lengthy legal processes. 
Interviewed BSEC enforcement managers explained that companies often appeal to the 
higher Court and are awarded ‘stay orders’ against the penalties imposed by the BSEC. The 
legal system allows a repetitive ‘stay order’ for several years, with many cases not reaching 
any definitive conclusion. This lengthy legal process consumes time and resources and often 
works as a deterrent to seeking legal action by the regulators and general investors.  
 
We [BSEC] are semi-judicial body. The companies can appeal to the higher court3 
against the financial penalty imposed by the BSEC. Once a case goes to the higher 
court, it takes time to settle the issue. Often, the companies get ‘stay order’ from the 
higher court to stop the hearing in the BSEC. Many companies take advantage of the 
limitations of the current legal system to hold the court proceedings for several years. 
At some stage, we give up and stop pursuing the companies who breached the 
disclosure regulations. We need a special bench of the higher court who will deal the 
issues quickly and efficiently. [Deputy Director of the BSEC] 
 
The interviewed BSEC officials revealed that they had sent financial statements of some listed 
companies to the ICAB for further examination as they felt that the financial statements did 
not comply with the accounting standards. According to the BSEC officials, the ICAB did not 
investigate the financial statements and no action was taken by the ICAB against the auditors 
and accountants for failing to discharge their professional responsibilities. This is further 
evidence of local level regulations presenting a ceremonial image decoupled from actual 
practice. Thus, similarly to the auditors, regulators are powerless to produce effective 
regulatory or standards enforcement. From an NIT perspective, they emerge as passive actors 
standing on the sidelines as mute witnesses to the national game of accountability failure and 
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reporting manipulation. In a sense, they maintain watch over a chaotic corporate governance 
environment that persists as an ongoing and stable phenomenon. 
 
In response to this situation, a number of interviewees highlighted the need to reform the 
Companies Act 1994 to specify the financial reporting requirements and applicable standards 
for all companies. Interviewed senior audit managers also suggested regulatory bodies 
coordinate their activities in specifying accounting standards and enforcing their compliance. 
They also highlighted that sharing information between regulatory bodies about the 
accounting record of business entities would encourage integrity in financial reporting 
practices. 
 
It is a common practice to maintain three books of account – one for the bank, 
one for the tax office and one for the management. The banks, tax office and other 
regulatory organisation should ensure that a single set of accounts are prepared. 
This will create some pressure for businesses to bring integrity and reliability in 
their financial reporting practices. [Senior research fellow of a research institute] 
 
5.5 Financial reporting surveillance: from self-regulation to establishment of an 
oversight body 
 
In the context of limited oversight of financial reporting practices of regulatory organisations 
in Bangladesh, the private regulation of the accounting professional bodies becomes 
important. The ICAB, a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), has 
1583 members (designated as Chartered Accountant) (as of 01 July 2016, ICAB 2018). The 
members of the ICAB (chartered accountants) are eligible to receive a licence as auditors or 
accountants for public practice in Bangladesh. The second largest professional organisation is 
the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB) with 1271 
members (ICMAB, 2018). The ICAB adopts most of the IFRS without any changes and renames 
them as BFRS4. Mir and Rahman (2004) attributed the adoption of IFRS to the pressures by 
donor agencies on the Bangladeshi Government and professional accounting bodies.   
 
The membership and accreditation of IFAC and other international accounting 
bodies require the adoption of IFRS. This was the reason ICAB had adopted the 
IFRS as its prescribed accounting standards. Professional accounting bodies of 
many countries also accepted IFRS as their prescribed accounting standards.  
International organisations such the World Bank supports and encourage the 
adoption of IFRS to improve the financial reporting practices in Bangladesh. 
[Senior Audit Manager of a Big 4 Audit Firm] 
 
The training and provision of qualified accountants also constrains institutional reform, 
interviewed managers revealed financial reporting practices as being constrained by the 
limited number of chartered accountants available, therefore also limiting the preparation of 
financial reports in accordance with the IFRS. Interviewed senior managers of the professional 
accounting bodies also highlighted the difficulty in attracting high-calibre graduates to its 
chartered accountancy programs. The Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC)5 declared that about 90% of the students having successfully completed the ICAB 
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exams are business graduates from the University of Dhaka, which is the oldest and highest 
status University in the country. Many of the graduates entering into the accounting 
profession and ICAB’s Chartered Accountancy program come from other Universities but they 
often lack the required skills to complete the ICAB’s chartered accountancy programs. The 
issue became more prevalent once the ICAB revised its syllabus, study materials, and 
examination systems based on those of the UK’s Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICEAW), under the World Bank–led reform to strengthen the training and 
education for accounting profession in Bangladesh. Furthermore, the IFRS, as adopted by the 
ICAB, are not translated from English into Bengali. Highlighting the limitations within the 
business education in most tertiary education providers in Bangladesh, the World Bank (2015, 
p. 27) reports: 
 
Teaching and examination quality remain significant challenges, especially for the 
education institutes under the National University6. Entrants from public 
universities (includes the National University) are weak in English as the medium 
of class lectures is Bengali and exams are mostly in Bengali. Overall, the entrants 
(to the ICAB’s Chartered program) fall short in the critical-thinking and analytical 
ability required for being a professional accountant. 
 
The limited cohort of professional accountants is also reflected in the profile of the accounting 
firms providing accounting and auditing services, the majority of them being very small in size. 
There are few large accounting firms (including the Big 4) and a limited number of mid-sized 
firms. In most cases, small accounting practices have one or two partners (chartered 
accountants) with a limited client base. Due to the inability to compete with the big firms and 
low audit fees, small firms cannot hire qualified staff. This also forces these smaller firms to 
compromise audit quality in order to retain the smaller clientele. 
 
Our company, like most multinational companies operating in Bangladesh, appoint 
one of the big 4 accounting firm to conduct audit. The big 4 has accounting experts 
who can interpret the IFRS. As a multinational company, we need to follow IFRS as 
part of our global accounting platform. We hired a lot more chartered accountant 
than many local companies as we need the expertise to apply IFRS. As a multinational 
company, our accounting department is sufficiently resourced with professional 
accountants and accounting information system. [Senior Manager, Multinational 
Company] 
 
Of the small professional accounting community in Bangladesh, about a quarter of  the 
members of ICAB (chartered accountants) work overseas (ICAB, 2018). Thus, the ICAB 
members have a very small local professional community in which they know each other very 
well. According to the interviewed regulators (the BSEC and the Bangladesh Bank), the ICAB 
takes a very lax approach to accounting regulation as it is entirely dominated by the interests 
of its members. 
 
The important thing to consider here is that who is regulating whom. For example, I 
should not be only authority to regulate myself, right. The auditors run ICAB. Auditors 
are the members of all committees of the ICAB. They will not set any rules or 
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undertake any activities that may harm their business. I myself will not set any rules 
that may harm me. The ICAB is a members’ club. I think that we need independent 
member in the ICAB’s Board to check the quality of auditors’ work. [Senior Audit 
Manager of a big 4 accounting firm] 
 
As a self-regulatory body, the ICAB does not have the structure and resources to oversee the 
activities of its members. Most of the committees of the ICAB are convened by volunteer 
chartered accountants. As the committee members are elected for short terms, they do not 
feel motivated to take disciplinary actions against other members. The activities of the ICAB 
are primarily limited to management of the professional accountancy examination. It does 
not play an effective role in ensuring quality of audit and accounting practices conducted by 
its members. 
 
The ICAB suffers from weaknesses in its institutional capacity to strengthen the 
financial reporting practices in Bangladesh. Most of its committees are occupied by 
member auditors who volunteer their time. The ICAB need employ more chartered 
accountants, researchers and analysts to perform its oversight and development 
functions. Currently, it does not have adequate resource and capacity to contribute 
to the development of accounting and auditing practices in Bangladesh. [Audit 
Partner of an accounting firm] 
 
With respect to audit services, investors and creditors have serious concerns about the quality 
of audits in Bangladesh. Many auditors are financially dependent on their clients, 
interviewees arguing that many auditors provide audit reports without undertaking adequate 
audit work. Neither banks nor investors have confidence in companies’ audited financial 
statements, with banks often not using audited financial reports of borrower companies in 
their credit evaluation process: 
 
Some auditors keep audit reports ready for purchase for a fee. Even though we talk 
about the lack of reliability of audit report, in my knowledge no banks have ever sued 
an auditor. Some auditors issue audit report without examining the financial 
statements of companies. We are missing the culture that auditors are accountable 
for their actions and the need to act professionally and ethically. [Vice President of a 
local bank] 
 
Poor quality audits are aggravated by low levels of audit fees. According to auditors and report 
preparers, the current audit fees are not sufficient to conduct a good quality audit. The low 
audit fees and associated revenue streams also limit the ability of the accounting firms to hire 
accountants with the required skills.  
 
The audit fees we get from a bank is not adequate to undertake a high quality 
audit. We visit only a handful of bank branches and perform limited audit 
functions. The banks are making large profit, but they are not willing to pay audit 
fees, which can ensure high quality audit. When we raise this issue with the bank, 
they say that there are many auditor who are willing to offer the audit service at 
the current fees. The senior managers of the banks do not understand the value 
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of good quality audit and as such not will not commit resources for it. The ICAB 
should intervene and investigate how a good quality audit is possible with the 
current fee structure? [Senior audit manager, accounting firm] 
 
The failure of the existing regulators in ensuring the quality of financial reporting practices 
and the perceived low credibility of audit reports resulted in proposals to establish an 
independent oversight body. This was initially proposed by the World Bank and then 
considered by ICAB, BSEC and Ministry of Finance (World Bank, 2003). The establishment of 
such body was delayed because of disagreement about its structure, authority and 
membership. For example, interviewed auditors and preparers of financial reports expressed 
fears that government bureaucrats will be appointed as the members of the oversight body. 
They believe that an accounting oversight body should be resourced with accounting experts 
(senior chartered accountants with auditing experience). However, the interviewed senior 
managers of the BSEC believed that an accounting oversight body should be independent 
from the control of the ICAB and its membership should come from different stakeholders 
within the business and regulatory communities. This may reflect local actors’ differing 
political objectives, hence delaying further efforts to institutionalise financial reporting 
transparency. 
 
The Financial Reporting Act 2015 was finally approved by the Bangladesh Parliament leading 
to the establishment of a new oversight body, Financial Reporting Council (FRC).  The newly 
established body assumes the responsibility of accounting and auditing standard setting, 
financial reporting monitoring, audit practice review and enforcement of disciplinary actions. 
This resulted in a significant change in accounting standard setting and auditing oversight 
arrangements in Bangladesh. The interviewed audit managers and preparers of financial 
reports were sceptical about the structure and ability of the newly established FRC in bringing 
any effective improvement in the financial reporting and auditing practices in the country. 
 
The FRC is responsible for accounting standard setting, overseeing audit quality 
and ensuring compliance with accounting standards. How will they do it when 
most of its members do not have specialised accounting and auditing expertise? 
Most of the members are nominated by the government representing various 
regulatory institutions. Standard setting and surveillance of audit and reporting 
quality requires specialised accounting knowledge and experience. How will the 
FRC be able to perform the tasks without the involvement of expert accounting 
professionals? [Preparer of financial statements and Project manager of a large 
NGO]  
 
Interviewed senior audit managers believed that the formation of FRC is not going to provide 
an ‘automatic’ solution to the problems. Again referencing the regulatory enforcement 
resourcing restrictions, they cautioned that a lack of accounting expertise, resources and 
enforcement power could potentially render the FRC similar to the existing regulators 
operating in this space. Interviewed preparers of financial reports believe that the 
effectiveness of the existing regulators needs significant improvement before a financial 
reporting culture in corporate entities in Bangladesh can be created.  
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It is unfortunate that we [ICAB] lost some of our authorities over the financial 
reporting in Bangladesh. The FRC will now assume the responsibility to provide 
accounting standards and monitor the financial reporting and auditing practice. 
However, I do not believe that the formation of FRC is going to achieve any positive 
outcome unless the existing limitations in the financial reporting environment is 
addressed. Bangladesh Bank for the banks, BSEC for the listed companies, RJSC for 
the registered entities and ICAB for its member auditors – all need to play their 
effective roles in bring discipline and credibility in financial reporting and auditing 
practices. FRC needs these regulators to perform effective oversight function to 
bring any noticeable improvement in accounting and auditing practices in the 
country.  [Preparer of financial reports in a large listed company and member of 
ICAB] 
 
 
6. Overall discussion 
 
The findings of this research provide evidence of a multi-level institutional construct as 
illuminated by Lounsbury (2008).  Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of how actors 
and institutions working at various levels influence the ultimate financial reporting framework 
and practices in Bangladesh. It has been argued that financial reporting practices are not 
subject to a given set of institutions in a particular space. Rather the reporting practices travel 
through a web of institutions situated in multiple spaces as represented by panel 1 (global), 
panel 2 (firm-level) and panel 3 (field-level) of Figure 1. Thus we construct a theoretical 
framework of institutional logics which operates in both international and local settings and 
also encompasses both firm- and field-level imperatives. This framework facilitates a better 
understanding of the financial reporting practices in developing countries such as Bangladesh 
as it reveals the existence and contestation of logics originating from various local and global 
actors and interests.     
 
Panel 1 in Figure 1 shows the existence of isomorphic pressures in the adoption of IFRS by 
some powerful actors. Tyrrall et al. (2007) found similar evidence in Kazakhstan where foreign 
financial aid was conditioned upon acceptance of IFRS, international auditing standards and 
internationally recognised audit firms. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) impose conditions such as IFRS compliance financial reports for local organisations to 
access their loans. The BSEC mandated IFRS for listed companies in order to portray an image 
of high quality financial reporting practices to attract local and foreign investment in the 
country’s capital markets. This is consistent with the Bangladesh Government’s economic 
policy to encourage foreign investment. As a member of the IFAC, ICAB has adopted IFRS as 
a best practice financial reporting framework. Mimetic pressure has also been operative as 
majority of the accounting bodies of other countries adopted IFRS as their financial reporting 
standards. Thus the professional accounting body and BSEC utilised the IFRS as an isomorphic 
stamp to claim conformity with the international best practice accounting framework.    
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
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Once IFRS entered into the Bangladesh reporting environment, the local institutions and 
actors at various levels influence how it is practised and enforced. Panel 2 of Figure 1 reports 
the firm-level characteristics prevailing in the Bangladeshi reporting environment. These 
forces correspond to research question 1 which investigated the firm-level forces influencing 
compliance with IFRS. Concentrated ownership of businesses in the promoter’s family creates 
an accounting culture of minimal disclosure of corporate information to external constituents 
(ordinary shareholders, banks, tax office and regulators). An important reason for inadequate 
levels of disclosure in Bangladesh relates to cultural attitudes such as secrecy and lack of 
transparency concerning corporate affairs. The accounting practices aim to serve the interests 
of the controlling families. The interviewed finance managers declared that accounting 
standards were often not complied with in order to deliberately restrict the flow of 
information to general investors and regulators. Thus as a powerful group of local actors, in 
pursuit of their own objectives, family owners have the clear ability to defy and undermine 
any IFRS implementation initiatives or any related national aspirations towards effective 
corporate governance and accountability. 
 
Lack of effective corporate governance practices further strengthen the power of family 
owners to control accounting practices. Controlling families’ influence over corporate 
governance mechanisms such as independent directors and audit committee, has created 
minimum pressures on managers for corporate accountability through external financial 
reporting. As a result, many business organisations lack reliable accounting infrastructure and 
skills. Though audited financial statements are required to be submitted to various regulatory 
bodies, the enforcement and oversight function of regulatory bodies remains largely 
ineffective. 
 
Panel 3 of Figure 1 reports the field-level institutions working in the Bangladeshi reporting 
environment. These forces correspond to the research question 2, which aims to investigate 
the field-level logics influencing the financial reporting practices. The legislative Acts clearly 
are inconsistent with respect to the financial reporting framework for companies. The 
Companies Act 1994 does not specify any particular set of accounting standards for registered 
companies. Another field-level characteristic affecting the compliance with IFRS is the small 
capital market in Bangladesh. This study finds evidence that some accounting standards (such 
as IFRS 10 and IFRS 39) and their underlying assumptions do not necessarily fully correspond 
to the economic environment of Bangladesh. The increasing embeddedness of fair value 
accounting in IFRS poses another critical area for its suitability in developing countries. The 
small size of the stock market in most developing countries makes it difficult to use market 
prices to value investment in financial instruments.  
 
Following Claessens and Fan (2002) and Holland (1999) this paper investigated the role of 
financial institutions in improving financial reporting governance of client companies. 
Evidence suggests that Bangladeshi banks do not exert any pressure on the borrowing 
organisations to install strong corporate governance and financial reporting systems as a 
qualification for financing. The credit evaluation process of many financial institutions is 
influenced by a collateral-focused approach, political pressures and controlling shareholders’ 
interests. As a result, the borrowing companies are not subject to pressure from the financial 
institutions to develop effective corporate governance and reporting practices. Thus, banking 
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institutions are complicit in the arguably minimalist governance and reporting conventions 
established at the corporate level. In taking this approach, wittingly or unwittingly, they 
entrench the institutionalisation of the very practices IFRS seeks to challenge. 
 
The regulatory organisations have limited oversight over the financial reporting practices of 
companies in Bangladesh. Lack of resources and technical accounting skills within the 
regulatory organisations severely constraints their oversight functions. Nurunnabi (2017) 
argued that the BSEC suffered from lack of accounting professionals to identify and police 
non-compliance with accounting standards by listed companies in Bangladesh. The 
interviewed Director of BSEC reported that the lack of enforcement actions and inadequate 
penalties for violating regulations failed to create pressures on companies to report 
responsibly.  A study by Nurunnabi (2014) found that the penalty for violating regulations and 
providing false information in financial reports are insignificant, amounting to not more than 
Tk. 200 (equivalent to US$ 2.38). 
 
Lack of audit quality and reliability in overall financial reporting practices were reflected in 
the World Bank’s ROSC recommendation to establish a new financial reporting oversight body 
in Bangladesh. The ICAB has opposed the formation of the new oversight body citing the 
necessity of self-regulation enforced by the accounting professional body. After being 
returned by the parliamentary committee on several occasions, the long-waited Financial 
Reporting Act was finally enacted as a legislation in 2015. This Act established the FRC, which 
was recommended by the World Bank7. As illuminated in research question 3, the World 
Bank’s pressure was able to outweigh the local accounting body’s resistance to change in 
regulatory arrangements. The FRC is responsible for introducing accounting standards and 
reviewing financial reporting practices in Bangladesh. Interviewed preparers and auditors of 
financial reports cautioned that the absence of resources and technical accounting skills could 
inhibit FRC inducing any improvement in financial reporting practices. This echoes Siddiqui’s 
(2018) assertion that FRC would require a substantial resource commitment to appointing 
accounting and auditing experts to perform the specialised task of accounting standard 
development and financial reporting surveillance. 
 
The World Bank’s prescription and the Bangladesh Government’s signalling an image of 
corporate effort to attract foreign investors resulted in IFRS being adopted as national 
accounting standards. However, the local firm- and field-level institutional logics moderated 
the efficacy of the IFRS-based reporting practices. The extent and influence of the institutional 
logics were not uniform across reporting entities. The MNCs follow the IFRS to comply with 
their global accounting framework. Some local firms comply with the IFRS to satisfy the 
conditions of receiving loans from international organisations such as the World Bank and 
IMF. This is consistent with Judge et al. (2010) who argued that foreign aid and the associated 
influence of the IMF often demand that financial reports be prepared following IFRS. In 
contrast, the listed companies are confronted with inconsistent requirements of the 
Companies Act 1994 and BSEC’s reporting requirements. Similarly, interviewed managers of 
banks reported diverse financial reporting practices, as the Bank Company Act 1991 does not 
mandate any specific set of accounting standards. The vast majority of private companies are 
not subject to any specific set of accounting standards as the RJSC suffers from a serious lack 
resources and capacities. One of the major features of Figure 1 is that the various institutional 
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logics have exerted differing influences on business entities resulting in diverse financial 
reporting practices in Bangladesh (represented by panel 4 in Figure 1). 
 
It is apparent that two institutional logics are predominant in relation to IFRS implementation. 
The first one is corporate ownership which essentially renders accountants and auditors 
submissive to the preferences and positions the promoters’ families. The political connections 
of the elite promoters’ families enable them to overpower the professional judgement and 
independence of accountants (managers) and even auditors. The second dominant 
institutional logic is the regulatory enforcement lacuna evident among the various regulators, 
in particular the BSEC and the Bangladesh Bank. The lack of regulatory oversight of the 
financial reporting practices seriously affects the reliability of financial reports in Bangladesh. 
After prolonged debate and resistance from the local accounting bodies, the World Bank was 
successful in pressuring the Government of Bangladesh to create a new financial reporting 
oversight body. This provided evidence that international pressures were not just limited to 
IFRS adoption, but influenced oversight regulations in this context. However, the 
effectiveness of this newly established oversight body is subject to empirical evaluation in the 
years ahead. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This research provides evidence of the complexity of the institutionalising process of World 
Bank-led accounting reforms in the Bangladeshi reporting environment.  While the World 
Bank and other donor agencies were successful in exercising their coercive power to establish 
IFRS in some select areas and to install the FRC as the oversight body in Bangladesh, other 
regulatory, political and professional institutions mediated the way in which these reforms 
were enforced and practised. 
 
Firm-level forces (as illumined through research question 1) appeared to influence the 
compliance with IFRS. As powerful actors, the family owners control the accounting and 
reporting practices even in large listed companies. Lack of corporate governance (such as 
family selected independent directors and inactive audit committees) enables the controlling 
family owners to create a management culture which tends to satisfy the former group’s 
interests. The controlling owners and their management are not under any strong pressure 
to establish an accountability structure through reliable financial reporting practice. This 
research found evidence of field-level constraints that limit regulatory oversight (as 
illuminated through research question 2) over financial reporting practice to ensure 
compliance with IFRS. The penalties enforced by the BSEC on listed companies and auditors 
for non-compliance with accounting standards are trivial. Thus while the national government 
may try to institutionalise IFRS, the entrenched positioning, relationships and influence of 
local institutions and actors can very effectively limit compliance with IFRS.  
 
The small size of the Bangladesh stock markets and lack of investors’ knowledge about 
accounting information are therefore inconsistent with a shareholders’ decision usefulness 
imperative of reporting structures such as the IFRS. The presumption of a shareholder-led 
demand for corporate accounting information does not correspond to the Bangladeshi 
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environment. As a major provider of external funding, the financial institutions do not ensure 
the existence of effective corporate governance and associated financial reporting practice in 
borrowing companies. Instead, they compromise with and institutionalise the existing opaque 
governance and accountability regime. While the banks and investors would benefit from 
reliable financial reporting governance, their fragile positions do not translate into an 
effective demand and pressure for high quality accounting information.  
 
The failure of the accounting profession and regulatory organisations creates a case for the 
Government to pursue the World Bank’s recommendation of forming an independent 
oversight body, the FRC. The formation of the new financial reporting oversight body was 
vigorously contested by the accounting profession’s apex body, ICAB. The competing logics of 
the Government and BSEC was based on the perceived ineffectiveness of the audit profession 
in ensuring compliance with IFRS.  This change in institutional order reflected a contestation 
of logics in creating, sustaining and changing institutional order. The change has resulted in a 
transfer of significant oversight power from the ICAB to the FRC. This change in oversight 
order, as envisioned by research question 3, offers evidence of continuous contestation of 
competing logics in financial reporting oversight functions. This also provides support for the 
ability of international development organisations such as the World Bank to influence 
financial reporting regulation beyond the adoption of IFRS as national accounting standards 
in a developing country.  
 
With respect to developing countries generally, this study suggests that national institutions 
operating at various levels may inhibit high quality financial reporting practices. Any 
accounting reform should consider a holistic approach in encouraging these institutions to 
move towards financial reporting transparency and accountability. Such a holistic approach 
needs to address the weaknesses in national institutions that may prevail at field and firm 
levels. Using the institutional logics framework, this paper has mapped the various logics that 
may prevail at different levels of the financial reporting environment. Such mapping (as 
expressed through Figure 1 and explained in section 6) combine firm- and field-level logics 
and practice varieties in a multi-level analytical construct. This knowledge is useful for 
national and international regulators and policy-makers charged with managing financial 
reporting reforms. Such mapping can enable policy-makers to investigate the relative 
strength of pervasive logics and how they may be intertwined in the institutional 
environment, thereby shaping reporting practices. This study identifies evidence of two logics 
that can dominate the institutional environment, namely, familial corporate ownerships and 
an accounting regulation enforcement lacuna. These may require accounting reformer 
attention and management in many developing country contexts. 
 
Future research can examine in detail the influence of individual logics at various levels of the 
financial reporting environment of Bangladesh. There could also be connections between the 
logics operating at multiple levels. For example, strengthening the role of financial institutions 
in developing borrowers’ financial reporting governance may affect firm-level financial 
reporting incentives. Similarly, reforms in the audit profession and an effective oversight from 
the newly established FRC could influence auditors and preparers’ attitudes toward 
compliance with IFRS. Further research could also investigate the interrelations and 
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contestation between logics, in particular in the aftermath of reform in one logic such as 
banking regulations or FRC. 
 
The globalisation of trade and capital creates the need to understand accounting and 
associated accountability practices across national boundaries. One step in the move toward 
a global accountability platform is the adoption of IFRS by most countries of the world. 
However, the prima facie adoption of IFRS is a panacea for limited accounting and associated 
accountability in developing countries. This study’s mapping of institutional logics at firm, 
local and global spaces indicate the complexity and dynamics of financial reporting incentives, 
pressures and practices. It has revealed some of the key firm- and field-level logics that 
influence the corporate managers’ engagement in financial reporting and accountability. Any 
effort to understand and improve accounting practices of a developing country need to 
consider the power, contestation and influence of multiple logics operating in its institutional 
environment. Two institutional logics emerged as prominent candidates for reform in 
accounting practices. One is the need to develop a professional accounting culture within 
corporate management whose purpose extends beyond serving the interests of promoters’ 
family kinships. Second, further reform requires developing a management capacity within 
regulatory bodies to develop and enforce a coherent set of financial reporting standards. The 
findings of this research project are relevant to regulators, professional accounting bodies 
and other institutions (such as stock exchanges) who are concerned with structural reforms 
to address the limitations of current financial reporting practices in developing countries. This 
study’s findings suggest that policy makers need to be strategic in working to influence a set 
of firm- and field-level institutional logics with a view to bringing effective outcomes from 
financial reporting reforms in a developing country like Bangladesh.  
 
 
Notes 
1 Following Lamb et al. (1998), the term ‘Anglo Saxon’ refers to those countries where 
accounting practices are seen as market-driven and accounting standards are developed by 
non-government bodies. Countries like UK, US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada are 
examples. 
2 The Bank Company Act 1991 was amended in 2013. However, the title of the Act was 
retained as Bank Company Act 1991 with a note that it was amended until 2013 (Bangladesh 
Bank, 2019). 
3 The legal system in Bangladesh is characterised by different layers. The civil cases may be 
tried at lower court (also known as Magistrate Court). Then appeal may be lodged in the 
higher court (also known as Supreme Court) against the verdict or proceedings of the lower 
court. The Companies Act 1994 gives BSEC the power to penalise in civil cases (relating to the 
company affairs specified by the Act). However, appeal may be made in the higher court 
against the decision of the BSEC. The criminal cases relating to the company affairs will be 
handled by the Magistrate Court.     
4  The standards issued by the ICAB based on International Accounting Standards (IAS) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were called Bangladesh Accounting 
Standards (BAS) and Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards (BFRS) respectively. This paper 
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utilised the term ‘IFRS’ to refer the BAS and BFRS, as the local Bangladesh accounting 
standards are identical to those issued by IASB. 
5 ROSC is a periodic publication of the World Bank about the quality of corporate financial 
reporting and auditing in developing countries. 
6 National University is the largest general education provider at the tertiary level. About 2 
million students are studying in about 2300 colleges affiliated to this University (National 
University Bangladesh, 2018).  
7 The World Bank (2015) recommended two options in relation to strengthening the 
regulatory framework: (i) establishment of a new oversight body (FRC) and (ii) (in case an 
oversight body is not established) the governance structure of the ICAB needs to be reframed 
to improve its authority, independence and  effectiveness to ensure financial reporting and 
audit quality in Bangladesh. 
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Appendix A: Industry, designation and education of the interviewed participants. 
 
 
Industry/sector Designation/rank of the interviewees Education 
Bank (local) Chief Finance Officer M.Com., FCA 
Bank (Local) Senior Manager MBA 
Bank (Local) General Manager (Credit) MBA 
Bank (Local) Chief executive officer Masters, FCA 
Bank (Foreign) Head of Finance MBA 
Bank (Foreign) General Manager M.Com. 
Bank (Foreign) Corporate Sustainability & Communications 
Manager 
MBA 
Bank (Foreign) Finance Controller M.Com., FCA 
MNC Senior Manager M.Com. 
MNC Senior Manager M.A. 
Large local (listed) co. Chief Finance Officer M.Com., FCA 
Large local (listed) co. General Manager B.Sc. 
Large local (listed) co. General Manager, Public Relations Division Masters 
Large local (listed) co. General Manager (Accounts) M.Com. 
Local private company Head of Finance and Accounts Masters, FCA 
Local private company Marketing Manager B.A. 
Local private company Administrative Manager B.A. 
Auditor Audit partner M.Com., FCA 
Auditor (Big 4) Senior audit manager M.Com., FCA 
Auditor Senior audit manager M.Com., FCA 
Research institute Project Director M.A. 
Research institute Senior research fellow M.A. 
World Bank Project Director MBA 
World Bank Project Manager Masters 
Bangladesh Bank General Manager M.Sc. 
Bangladesh Bank Executive Director M.A. 
Bangladesh Bank Deputy General Manager M.A. 
Bangladesh Bank Deputy General Manager M.Com. 
BSEC Executive Director M.A. 
BSEC Director M.Com. 
BSEC Deputy Director M.Com. 
NGO Project Manager M.Sc. 
NGO General Manager M.A. 
Individual investor General investor in the Dhaka Stock Exchange M.A. 
Individual investor General investor in the Dhaka Stock Exchange B.A. 
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Appendix B: Guiding interview questions 
 
1. What is your opinion about the accounting information and reporting systems in 
Bangladeshi companies? 
2. To what extent are the IFRS followed in Bangladesh? 
3. What is your opinion of the quality of audits in Bangladesh? 
4. How effective is the corporate governance in Bangladeshi companies? 
5. To what extent do boards monitor their organisation’s financial reporting 
processes? 
6. What are the challenges for the newly established Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) to improve financial reporting practices in Bangladesh? 
7. What are the roles of the SEC and the DSE in the enforcement of accounting 
standards in Bangladesh? 
8. What role do the banks play in strengthening the financial reporting practices of 
borrower companies? 
9. What role does the ICAB play in improving the financial reporting and auditing 
quality in Bangladesh?  
10. What are the ways in which quality of financial reporting and auditing may be 
improved? 
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Table 1: Sectoral allocation of interviews 
 
Industry/Sector Classification Number 
of 
entities 
Number of 
interviewees 
Listed companies Preparers 4 4 
Local private companies Preparers 3 3 
Multinational companies (MNCs) Preparers 2 2 
Auditors Auditing 3 3 
Banks (Local and foreign ownership) Users 8 8 
Individual investors   2 
Bangladesh Bank 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange  
Commission (BSEC) 
 
Regulators 
1 
 
1 
4 
 
3 
Research institute 
World Bank 
Non-government Organisation (NGO) 
 
Other stakeholders 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Total  26 35 
 
 
Table 2: Regulators within the financial reporting environment in Bangladesh 
 
Agency Target entities Mandated accounting standards 
RJSC All companies (private 
and publicly listed) 
No specified accounting 
standards 
BSEC Companies listed on the 
stock exchanges 
IFRS 
Bangladesh Bank Private banks and 
financial institution. 
A selected number of IFRS 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) State-owned enterprises 
(SOE) 
No specified accounting 
standards 
National Board of Revenue 
(NBR) 
All companies No specified accounting 
standards 
ICAB Sole authority to issue 
auditing license 
IFRS 
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